This paper proposes an axiomatic analysis of Impact Factors when used as tools for ranking scientific journals. This work draws on the similarities between the problem of comparing distribution of citations among papers and that of comparing probability distributions on consequences as commonly done in decision theory. Our analysis singles out a number of characteristic properties of the ranking based on Impact Factors. It also suggests alternative ways of using distributions of citations to rank order journals. We illustrate our findings using citation data for a small sample of economic journals.
Introduction
The traditional way to evaluate research is to rely on peer judgement. Because this evaluation technique is costly and may suffer from a number of problems (Campanario, 1998a,b) , the bibliometric literature has developed alternative tools, mainly based on various ways of counting citations (Garfield, 1955 (Garfield, , 1972 (Garfield, , 1979 . As noted by van Raan (2005, p. 2) , this "unavoidably introduces a bibliometrically limited view of a complex reality".
Among the numerous bibliometric indices that have been proposed in the literature, Impact Factors (IFs) of journals stand out as being among the oldest and the most widely used when it comes to evaluate journals. Glänzel and Moed (2002, p. 172) describe IFs as "a fundamental citation-based measure for significance and performance of scientific journals". Roughly speaking, the IF of a journal gives the mean number of citations received by papers published in this journal. Clearly the computation of this number requires taking many choices such as the definition of the adequate time-window to collect citations or the choice of an adequate database. Choices made by Thomson Reuters in its annual edition of the "Journal Citation Report" (JCR) (Thomson Reuters, 2009a ) often serve as a benchmark, although they have often been criticized (Adler et al, 2008) , e.g., because of language biases in the database, of the choice of two-year time-window to collect citations, etc. We refer the reader to Glänzel and Moed (2002) for a thorough overview on IFs. Archambault and Larivière (2009) and Garfield (2006) detail the history and origins of IFs.
IFs are not the only bibliometric indices that have been introduced in the literature. Recent years have seen a flourishing of such indices, including, e.g., the h-index (Hirsch, 2005) and the g-index (Egghe, 2006) . These new indices have almost immediately after their introduction been studied from an axiomatic standpoint (Marchant, 2009a ,b, Quesada, 2009 , Woeginger, 2008a . Curiously, IFs, which are much older and more widely used, have not been subjected to such an analysis. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap.
Our treatment of the ranking of journals based on IFs rests on a fairly simple intuition. In order to compute the IF of a journal, it is only necessary to know how many papers published in this journal have received x citations, for all integer x, i.e., the distribution of citations for the journal. Comparing distributions of citations bears a striking resemblance with the problem of comparing probability distributions on consequences, a classical problem in decision theory. Exploiting this similarity will allow us to provide a simple axiomatic foundation to the ranking of journals based on IFs. This will also lead us to suggest alternative rankings that use generalizations of IFs.
Let us stress here that the axiomatic analysis in this paper should not be interpreted as an attempt to give a "theoretical justification" to the ranking of journals based on IFs. We are well aware of the "impact factor debate" evoked in Bar-Ilan (2008, p. 22) . A good overview of the critical literature on IFs may be found in Adam (2002) , Adler et al (2008) , Amin and Mabe (2000) and Seglen (1997) . Our analysis does not provide (and is not intended to provide) answers to the important problems raised in this literature. Our more modest aim will be to single out the ranking of journals based on IFs within the class of all possible bibliometric ranking of journals, using a number of simple conditions. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our framework and notation. Section 3 presents the main conditions used in the paper. Section 4 characterizes a class of bibliometric rankings of journals that include the one based on IFs as a particular case. Section 5 specializes this analysis to characterize the ranking based on IFs. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A illustrates some of our findings using citation data for a small sample of economic journals.
Notation and definitions
Each published paper receives citations from other papers. We take here these citations as given and we do not discuss here the various ways in which such citations may or should be computed (e.g., what is the set of journals that should be included in the database, what is the relevant time window to collect citations, how should we deal with self-citations, etc.). As is usual in bibliometrics, the only aspect of papers that is taken into account in our analysis is the number of citations that they receive.
We model a journal as a set of papers, consistently with the approach used in Marchant (2009a,b) to deal with authors. For our purposes, we may model a journal a as a function from N to N where, for all x ∈ N, a(x) is interpreted as the number of papers published in the journal a having received exactly x citations. Hence, we identify a journal with its distribution of citations. We will restrict our attention to journals for which, for all x ∈ N, a(x) is finite and, furthermore, there are only a finite number of y ∈ N such that a(y) = 0. We define the set of all journals J = {a, b, . . . } as the set of all all functions from N to N satisfying the above two constraints. This way of modelling journals is rough since it does not explicitly consider authors and papers. A more refined model is used in Bouyssou and Marchant (2009) in order to consistently rank both journals and authors.
Using the above notation, it is clear that journal a ∈ J has published a number of papers given by
The number of citations received by the papers published in a ∈ J is simply given by:
By definition, the Impact Factor IF (a) of journal a ∈ J represents the average number of citations received by the papers published in a, i.e.,
.
We will be concerned here with the ranking that is induced on the set J of all journals by the values IF , i.e., the binary relation IF defined letting, for all
Our main objective will be to characterize the relation IF within the class of all possible binary relations on J . It may be useful to stress a number of important points about our framework. Observe first that the set of journals J includes infinitely many journals since journals having all possible distribution of citations belong to J . Such a rich set of journals J will allow us to keep the analysis simple. Second, our framework is such that it makes sense to "add" two journals or to "multiply" a journal by an integer. Indeed, if a, b ∈ J , it is clear that a + b ∈ J and n · a ∈ J , for n ∈ N (i.e., for all a, b ∈ J and for all n ∈ N, there are c, d ∈ J such that c(x) = a(x) + b(x) and d(x) = na(x), for all x ∈ N). Finally it is important to keep in mind that this framework is inadequate to analyze models in which the "weight" of a citation could depend on the citing paper, e.g., through the journal in which the citing paper is published, as in Palacios-Huerta and Volij (2004) . A framework that would allow us to deal with such models would be far more complex than the present one, while not being much useful to understand the properties of the relation IF .
Axioms
Let be a binary relation on the set J of all journals 1 . We interpret as an "at least as good as" preference relation between journals (throughout the paper, we use the term "preference" to indicate what some readers may prefer to call "impact"). The relation denotes the asymmetric part of , i.e., the binary relation on J such that a b if [a b and Not[b a]]. We interpret as a "strict preference" relation between journals. The relation ∼ denotes the symmetric part of (i.e., a ∼ b if [a b and b a]) and is interpreted as an "indifference" relation between journals.
We consider several conditions on a binary relation on J .
A1 Weak order
The binary relation on J is a weak order, i.e., a complete (for all a, b ∈ J , a b or b a) and transitive (for all a, b, c ∈ J , [a b and b c] imply a c) binary relation.
It is clear that the relation IF as defined by (1) is a weak order. 1 i.e., a subset of J × J . As is usual, we will write a b instead of (a, b) ∈ .
In decision theory, starting with a preference relation that is a weak order is so classical that this condition hardly needs an elaboration in this context. The situation is slightly more complex here since we are dealing with a bibliometric comparison of journals. Basically, this condition states that we want a model able to compare all journals in a consistent way. This is a strong hypothesis that has been criticized. For instance, one may consider that small differences in the value of the index inducing the ranking should be neglected. This leads to intransitive relations ∼ and, hence, . Similarly, Adler et al (2008) argue that a sensible evaluation of journals should use several indices. This leads to possibly incomplete relations, as soon as these indices disagree.
A2 Homogeneity
For all a ∈ J and all n ∈ N such that n > 0, a ∼ n · a.
It is clear that the relation IF defined by (1) is homogeneous.
Homogeneity wishes to capture the initial motivation of Eugene Garfield to create an index that would be size-independent (as explained, e.g., in Garfield, 2006) through the normalization of the numbers of citations received by the size of the journal, measured by the number of papers it publishes. Without such a condition, a journal might well try to modify its ranking by asking authors to split all their papers into smaller units (e.g., requiring all papers to have a "part 1" and a "part 2").
Our framework identifies a journal with its distribution of citations. Technically, homogeneity allows us to transform the problem of comparing distributions of citations into a problem of comparing distributions of relative frequencies of citations, a problem that is quite similar to the one encountered in the field of decision making under risk in which one compares probability distributions on consequences (see, e.g., Fishburn, 1970, Ch. 8) .
A3 Independence
It is easy to check that the above condition is satisfied by the relation IF defined by (1). Indeed, since N (a) = N (c), we have
This axiom says that the comparison of two journals of equal size (in terms of the number of papers that they publish) is not affected if each of them merges with the same journal having the same size. Intuitively, it is hard to imagine situations in which this condition would be undesirable. Nevertheless, this condition is far from being innocuous. For instance journal a may have no uncited papers, which may be the initial reason for stating that a b in spite of the fact that b contains many highly cited papers. After the merger with c, the journal a + c, can have many uncited papers, which may clearly affect its comparison with b + c.
A4 Archimedean condition
for some n, m, n , m ∈ N that are strictly positive.
It is easy to check that the above condition is satisfied by the relation IF defined by (1). Indeed, since N (a) = N (c), we have This axiom is more difficult to interpret than the preceding ones. Take three journals of equal size a, b, c ∈ J with b being "between" a and c in terms of desirability. The axiom introduces a new journal n · a + m · c that consists of the addition n times journal a plus m times journal c. This new journal "combines" the most preferred journal a with the least preferred one c. If n is large compared to m, the influence of the least desirable journal c in the journal n · a + m · c will be small. Hence, when we compare it with journal (n + m) · b, i.e., the intermediate journal scaled up to have the same size as the new journal, we should prefer the new journal. The interpretation of the other part of the axiom is similar. The Archimedean condition would fail if some journals in J were "infinitely desirable", so that combining them with other ones in whatever manner would always lead to an infinitely desirable journal. Archimedean-like axioms are necessary as soon as one wishes to obtain a weak order that has a numerical representation (see Krantz et al, 1971) , which is clearly the case for IF defined by (1).
A5 Increasingness
This axiom is a very mild one. It says that when we compare journal having published a single paper, the one having received more citations should be preferred. This condition is clearly satisfied by the relation IF defined by (1).
It turns out that the above five conditions characterize an interesting class of bibliometric rankings of journals that contains the relation IF .
Rankings using Generalized Impact Factors
We consider a family of bibliometric rankings that are very close to IF except that the "value" of a paper having x citations is now computed using an increasing function u instead of the identity function, i.e., what we will call a Generalized Impact Factor (GIF).
Result
The five conditions introduced in the preceding section are all that is needed to characterize relations comparing journals using GIFs.
Theorem 1
A binary relation on J satisfies axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 iff there is an increasing real-valued function u on N such that, for all a, b ∈ J ,
The function u is unique up to scale and location, i.e., if there are two increasing real-valued functions u and v on N such that (2) holds, then u = γv + δ, for some γ, δ ∈ R with γ > 0.
Going from model (2) to model (1) requires supposing that the function u is affine, i.e., that, for all x ∈ N, u(x) = αx + β with α, β ∈ R and α > 0. We discuss below the interpretation that can be given to the function u in model (2). Our proof of Theorem 1 exploits the similarity between our problem and classical results in expected utility theory. We first use the homogeneity condition to transform the problem of comparing journals, i.e., functions from N to N, into a problem of comparison of probability distributions on N having a finite support with rational components, i.e., using only probabilities in Q. We then use a result in Shepherdson (1980) that gives necessary and sufficient conditions for an expected utility representation of a relation comparing probability distributions with finite support and rational components.
One possible virtue of Theorem 1 is the following. Suppose that someone suggests to rank order journals using a new bibliometric index that is not a GIF, e.g., the median of the distribution of citations. Then Theorem 1 asserts that the ranking based on this new index will violate at least one the five axioms that are used. Discussions centered around axioms instead of discussions centered about the "intuitive reasonableness" of a new index may shed a new light on the debate.
Proof of Theorem 1
Necessity is easily established. We prove sufficiency.
Let us associate to each journal a ∈ J a probability distribution π a with finite support and rational components on N defining, for all x ∈ N,
i.e., π a (x) is the proportion of papers published by a ∈ J having received x citations.
Suppose that a, b ∈ J are such that π a = π b . Using the homogeneity axiom, we know that
for all x ∈ N, so that a = b and, thus, a ∼ b . Using the transitivity of ∼, we therefore conclude that
Let us define a relation * on the set ∆ of all probability distributions with finite support and rational components on N, letting, for all p, q ∈ ∆,
We claim that, for all a, b ∈ J , ii -for all p, q, r ∈ ∆, p * q implies iii -for all p, q, r ∈ ∆, p * q and q * r implies λp + (1 − λ)r * q and q * µp + (1 − µ)r, for some λ, µ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q.
Using Shepherdson (1980, corollary 5 .2, p. 106), we know that there is a real-valued function u on N such that, for all p, q ∈ ∆,
where u is unique up to scale and location. Hence, we have, for all a, b ∈ J ,
Let us show that, under Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 on , conditions i, ii, and iii on * hold. Observe first that, for all p ∈ ∆, there is an a ∈ J such that p = π a . Since we know that a b ⇔ π a * π b , it is clear that * is complete and transitive. . We have λ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q. It is easy to check that π n·a+m·c = λπ a + (1 − λ)π c and π (n+m)·b = π b . Hence, we have λπ a + (1 − λ)π c * π b , for some λ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ Q. The proof of the other part of the condition is entirely similar.
Noting that condition 5 clearly implies that u must be increasing completes the proof.
Interpretation
Theorem 1 singles out within all bibliometric rankings of journals, a class of rankings based on GIFs. GIFs contain IFs as particular cases. Their computation amounts to using an increasing function u that gives the "utility" of the number of citations received. This raises the problem of the interpretation of such a function and of the choice of a particular function u.
Readers familiar with Expected Utility theory will surely have noticed the links between the function u used in Theorem 1 and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function. The interpretation of u in the context of the bibliometric ranking of journals is similar to its interpretation in Expected Utility Theory (see Arrow, 1965 , Pratt, 1964 . However, more care should be taken here since we cannot simply refer to the "preferences of decision maker".
Consider, e.g., the case of two journals, a, b ∈ J . Journal a has published two papers, each of them being cited once. We have N (a) = 2 and C(a) = 2, so that IF (a) = 1. Journal b has also published two papers. The first has never been cited. The second have been cited twice. We have N (b) = 2 and C(b) = 2, so that IF (b) = 1. Hence, these two journals are equivalent from the point of view of their IFs. Comparisons based on IFs implicitly suppose a "risk neutral" attitude implying that when comparing distributions of citations only their means matter. Seglen (1997, p. 499) warns us that "citation rate of article determines journal impact, but not vice versa". Nevertheless, we think likely that the past distribution of citations of papers published in a journal gives some information on the selection process of papers in this journal and its visibility in the scientific community. Hence, this past distribution may give some information about the future citations of newly published papers in this journal. If this is so, we may consider the first journal considered above is less "risky" than the second one since it has a less dispersed distribution of citations. Such a reasoning appears to have some validity both for authors considering submitting a paper to one of these journals and for evaluators willing to rank order these journals. Such a risk averse attitude may lead to prefer journal a to journal b. This behavior is easily captured using our model based on GIFs, provided that u is chosen to be concave. More generally, under the hypotheses made above, it is clear that the literature on risk aversion in Expected Utility theory can be transposed to our problem of comparing distributions of citations. Hence the function u in our GIFs could be interpreted as modelling an "attitude towards risk" when it comes to comparing distributions of citations. A concave function u will tend to favor journals having a distribution of citations centered around its mean, whereas a convex u will tend to favor journals having a more dispersed distribution of citations, having, e.g., a few papers with an exceptional number of citations. The literature on "risk aversion" in decision making under risk (Arrow, 1965 , Pratt, 1964 has devised various indices to compare "degrees of risk aversion" and various remarkable classes of utility functions, e.g., the CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) or the DARA (Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion) classes. This literature may be of much help to guide the choice of a function u in our context.
A particularly interesting use of the model based on GIFs is obtained when considering comparisons between journal that are valid not just for one function u but for a whole set of such functions. Clearly such comparisons are much more robust than the ones based on a single function u. The literature on stochastic dominance between distributions gives useful hints for doing so (Fishburn and Vickson, 1978 , Levy, 1992 , 1998 .
Let, for all x ∈ N,
a (x) is the proportion of papers published in journal a having received at most x citations. First order stochastic dominance corresponds to the case in which F
(1)
b (x), for all x ∈ N. Intuitively, the proportion of paper having less than x citations is greater for journal b than for journal a, for all x. In such a case, we know that GIF u (a) ≥ GIF u (b), for all increasing functions u on N (Fishburn and Vickson, 1978) .
Similarly defining, for all x ∈ N,
second order stochastic dominance corresponds to the case in which F (2)
b (x), for all x ∈ N. When this happens, we know that GIF u (a) ≥ GIF u (b), for all increasing and concave functions u on N. The intuition behind this property is related to the fact that when two journals have the same IF, if
for all x ∈ N, then one can go from a to b through a series of "mean-preserving" spreads (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1970) , i.e., transformations that increase the dispersion of the distribution around its mean.
In spite of the fact that distributions of citations for most journals are highly skewed (Seglen, 1992) , cases of first or second order stochastic dominance occur when comparing journals. We have collected the distribution of citations on eight economic journals. The results presented in Appendix A, reveal that although most of the distributions are indeed skewed, cases of first order or second order stochastic dominance are not uncommon. Using the idea of stochastic dominance leads to robust comparisons of journal based on bibliometric data. These robust comparisons are not as incomplete as could have been expected.
Independence of axioms
The following five examples show that none of the conditions used in Theorem 1 is redundant.
Example 1 (Not A1) Let 1 and 2 be two binary relations on J satisfying the conditions of Theorem 1. Define the relation = 1 ∩ 2 . It is easy to check that satisfies Axioms 2, 3, 4, and 5. It violates Axiom 1 as soon as 1 = 2 , since, in this case, the relation is not complete. 
It is easy to check that Axioms 1, 2, 4, 5 and are satisfied. Axiom 3 is violated (see Fishburn, 1988, page 62) .
Example 4 (Not A4) Let u and v be two increasing real-valued functions on N that are not related by a positive affine transformation. Define the relation on J letting, for all a, b ∈ J
where ≥ L is the lexicographic order on R 2 . It is easy to check that Axioms 1, 2, 3, and 5 are satisfied. Axiom 4 is violated. Indeed, suppose that GIF u (a) = GIF u (b) > GIF u (c) and
We have a b and b c. But we have (p + q) · b p · a + q · c, for all strictly positive p, q ∈ N.
Example 5 (Not A5) Let u be a decreasing real-valued function on N. Define on J through (2). Axioms 1, 2, 3, 4 and are clearly satisfied. Axiom 5 is violated by construction.
Ranking using Impact Factors
This section investigates what must be added to the conditions used in Theorem 1 to guarantee that the function u becomes an affine function, implying that model (2) reduces to model (1). Basically, all that is needed here is an axiom that will imply that the preference relation between journals is "risk-neutral", meaning that it makes no difference between two distribution of citations having the same mean.
Consider a journal a ∈ J . Suppose that a paper published by a receives an additional citation. When journals are compared using IFs, it does not matter which of the papers published in a receives the additional citation. Any additional citation to any paper published in a will increase IF (a) by 1/N (a). This is characteristic of the ranking of journals using IFs. Since our framework is static, it is not flexible enough to analyze the case of a journal receiving an additional citation. Rather we will consider different journals in J that will allow for such an interpretation.
Let a ∈ J . Let I(a) = {x ∈ N : a(x) = 0}, i.e., I(a) is a set of integers x such that a has papers having been cited x times. For each x ∈ I(a), we can build a distribution corresponding to a journal a ↑x that is identical to that of a except that a paper published by a that was cited x times has now received an additional citation (again, note that our framework does not allow to distinguish citations according to their source, as done in Palacios-Huerta and Volij, 2004) . More precisely we have a ↑x (y) = a(y), for all y ∈ N \ {x, x + 1}, a ↑x (x) = a(x) − 1 and a ↑x (x + 1) = a(x + 1) + 1. Clearly, for all x ∈ I(a), the journal a ↑x has the same number of papers as a and has an additional citation.
The next condition says that all journals built in this way should be indifferent, i.e., an additional citation has always the same impact whatever the paper that receives it.
A6 Independence of Additional Citations
For all a ∈ J and for all x, y ∈ I(a), a ↑x ∼ a ↑y It is clear this additional condition is satisfied by the ranking defined by (1). When added to the conditions used in Theorem 1, it implies that u on N is affine so that models (2) and (1) coincide.
Theorem 2
A binary relation on J satisfies axioms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 iff, for all a, b ∈ J ,
Proof Necessity is clear. We show sufficiency. Using Theorem 1, we know that there is an increasing real-valued function u on N such that, for all a, b ∈ J ,
Consider the journal a x ∈ J such that such that a x (y) = 0 except that a x (x) = 1 and a x (x + 1) = 1. Hence the journal a x has two papers: one with x citations and the other with x + 1 citations. Let us apply Axiom 6 to a x , implying that the following two journals are indifferent. The first has two papers each one having x + 1 citations. The second has two papers, the first having x citations and the second having x + 2 citations. This implies that the function u must be such that:
Because this relation will hold for all x ∈ N, it is clear that u must be affine in x.
Because we know that u is increasing, it must be such that u(x) = αx + β with α, β ∈ R and α > 0. This completes the proof since ranking journals using such a function u is clearly equivalent to ranking journals according to their IFs.
As above, if someone suggests to rank order journals using a new bibliometric index that is not the IF and that uses the same information as in our model, we know that at least one the six axioms used in Theorem 2 will be violated.
The independence of the conditions used in Theorem 2 raises subtle questions. Since this is not central for our purpose, we will not detail this point here.
Discussion
This paper has analyzed the ranking of journals based on IFs using an axiomatic approach. We have given necessary and sufficient conditions for a binary relation comparing journals to coincide with the relation induced by IFs. Noticing the similarities between the problem of comparing distributions of citations with the classical problem of comparing probability distributions on consequences, we have suggested that GIFs involving an increasing real-valued function u may give useful information on the comparison of journal based on citation data. In Appendix A, we illustrate the interest of such a model using data on a small sample of economic journals. We would like to conclude with the mention of a few directions for future research and the indication of some of important limitations of the present study.
Once it is recognized that the problem of comparing distributions of citations is very similar to the problem of comparing probability distributions, it is clear that any model used in decision making under risk can be transposed to the case of comparing journals, if the homogeneity axiom is admitted. Some of these models are quite subtle, involving consistent violations of the independence condition (see, e.g. Gilboa, 2009 , Schmidt, 2004 , Sugden, 2004 , Wakker, 2009 . In particular models stemming from Expected Utility with Rank Dependent Probabilities can offer interesting approaches to cope with outliers in the distribution of citations. This will be the subject of future research.
Although importing models for decision making under risk in the area of bibliometrics may give rise to new and interesting concepts, such a transposition raises problems and questions. In decision making under risk, we model the preferences of a decision maker having to make a choice between risky prospects. The model wishes to be a useful guide to elicit her preferences and to help her choose. No such decision maker is present in bibliometrics. What is sought here are "indices" leading to rankings that would make sense to several persons (authors, editors, publishers, evaluators, etc) having potentially different perceptions and preferences. This seems to call for much caution in the above transposition. For instance, the weak order axiom is almost universally accepted in decision theory (see Fishburn, 1991, however) . Its reasonableness is far less obvious when it comes to compare journals (Adler et al, 2008) .
Another important limitation of our study is the static and rather rough character of our framework. It clearly does not allow to analyze the, often sweeping, consequences of publicizing a measure of impact of journals on the behavior of authors, editors, publishers or evaluators. It seems clear that the use of IFs has had consequences on academia that go far beyond the formal properties of the ranking that it induces on journals (Adler et al, 2008 , Monastersky, 2005 , Seglen, 1997 , Weingart, 2005 . These consequences are an essential part of the "Impact Factor debate" and are left untouched by the analysis presented here.
A Appendix: Citation data for some economic journals
This appendix wishes to test on real data the interest of modifying IFs using a "utility function" as proposed above. With this aim, we have selected a number of economic journals that are included in the Thomson Reuters databases. We have chosen economic journals because, although this is not our main field of research, we are familiar with the journals in the area. Note: "Others" include "Editorial matters", "Corrections", "News items", "Bibliographical items", "Proceedings papers", and "Book reviews". Extraction performed 1 December 2009. Table 2 gives, for each of the 8 journals, the number of citations received in 2008 by the "article" and "review" items published in 2006-2007. Dividing this number by the number of "article" and "review" items gives "our" 2008 Impact Factor for these journals. The 2008 JCR Impact Factors are also included in Table 2.  Table 3 gives, for each of the 8 journals, the number of items having received x citations. This information is also displayed in Figures 1, 2, 3 , and 4.
A cursory look at Figures 1-4 reveals that all distributions are highly skewed, as was expected (Seglen, 1992) . Nevertheless, all distributions do not have exactly the same shape, e.g., QJE and Eca have distributions that are much less skewed than the other ones in our sample. Hence, using a model that deals with "attitude towards risk" may lead to compare these journals in various ways.
Let us first observe that Table 3 contains cases of first order stochastic dominance between journals (see Table 4 This fact, once it is accepted that the information in Table 3 provides an adequate basis for comparing journals, is a strong indication that QJE, Eca, JEP, and JFE have a higher impact than RES. This conclusion is much stronger than the one based on the sole comparison of their IFs since it is valid for all rankings based on GIFs together with an increasing function u. A more refined way of comparing journal uses the idea of second order stochastic dominance. Rather unexpectedly, Table 3 contains many cases of second order of stochastic dominance: QJE dominates Eca, JEL, JEP, JFE, JPE, AER, and RES, Eca dominates JEL, JEP, JFE, JPE, AER, and RES, JEP, JFE, JPE, and AER dominate RES (see Table 5 ). These comparisons are valid for all rankings based on GIFs using an increasing and concave function u. Any author, editor, publisher or evaluator "averse to risk", in the sense of using an increasing and concave function u, will therefore agree with these preferences.
When two journals are not linked by second order stochastic dominance, different "attitudes to risk" may lead to different comparisons. For instance the Impact Factor of JEP is 3.420 while the Impact Factor of JFE is 3.394. Using a function u that is close to being risk neutral will therefore lead to prefer JEP to JFE. However, introducing more risk aversion may reverse this comparison. Consider for instance the family of CARA (Constant Absolute Risk Aversion) utility functions (Arrow, 1965 , Pratt, 1964 , for which we have u(x) = −e −τ x with τ > 0. For instance, when τ = 0.03, JFE becomes preferable to JEP.
Via the idea of stochastic dominance, we may therefore use the entire citation distributions to obtain robust comparison. With the introduction of functions u we may express subtle "attitudes" towards such distributions. 
a (x) = x i=0 π a (i). Source: Table 3 . 
a (i). Source: Table 3 .
